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INTRODUCTION
HE right to one's family is a core institution in our country and a
vital interest in our society that "undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection."' The
right of a parent has long been considered "essential to the orderly pur-
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law, Decem-
ber 2010; B.A., magna cum laude, Washington and Lee University, June 2007. I would like
to thank Professor Jessica Dixon Weaver for her comments and advice on a previous draft,
as well as Rebekah J. Bailey for her edits. With gratitude and love, I dedicate this com-
ment to my family, especially my husband, Marshall Viney, whose unwavering love, inspi-
ration, and support have blessed me beyond measure.
1. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
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suit of happiness by free men," 2 a fundamental liberty interest that "occu-
pies a unique place in our legal culture, given the centrality of family life
as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility." 3 Thus, the termi-
nation of parental rights is a "unique kind of deprivation" 4 and a pro-
ceeding in which the parent, at the very least, must have the right to be
heard. "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."5 The Supreme
Court has held, however, that indigent parents do not have a constitu-
tional right to counsel. 6 Whether these parents receive counsel in termi-
nation cases is left to individual state legislatures or determined by the
trial courts on case-by-case bases,7 leaving application of the right incon-
sistent from state to state and court to court.
On August 10, 2004, an indigent woman, Tracy Rhine, gave birth to her
daughter, J.C. Texas Child Protective Services (CPS) immediately re-
moved J.C. from her mother when she tested positive at birth for an ille-
gal narcotic.8 CPS then commenced a parental-rights termination suit
against Rhine in Dallas County.9 As required by the Texas Family Code,
the Court appointed counsel to Rhine for the duration of the proceed-
ings.10 After settlement negotiations, Rhine and CPS reached a mediated
agreement that would have allowed Rhine to regain custody, stipulated
on her satisfaction of certain conditions." A couple of weeks later, how-
ever, CPS nonsuited its termination case, and on the same day, J.C.'s fos-
ter parents initiated their own private termination suit in Tarrant County,
a plan the Fort Worth Court of Appeals labeled a "coordinated maneu-
ver." 12 Once the parental-rights termination suit became a private suit
brought by the foster parents, rather than one brought by the state, Rhine
lost her right to court-appointed counsel.' 3 After the Tarrant County
trial court judge refused to appoint counsel to Rhine, she was forced to
appear at the trial pro se, unable to properly make objections, cross-ex-
amine witnesses, or preserve the record for appeal. The trial predictably
resulted in permanent termination of Rhine's parental rights.14
On February 13, 2009, the Texas Supreme Court denied petition to
hear Tracy Rhine's appeal regarding her due process and equal protection
2. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
3. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 27 (majority opinion).
5. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
6. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
7. Id. at 31-32 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
8. In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d 486, 487 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied); Mary
Alice Robbins, Cert Sought over Right to Counsel in Parental-Rights Termination Case,
TEX. LAw., July 13, 2009, at 5.
9. In re .C., 250 S.W.3d at 487.
10. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West 2008).
11. The substance of this mediated agreement is unknown as it was not made part of
the trial record. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Rhine v.
Deaton, 130 S. Ct. 1281 (2010) (No. 08-1596), 2009 WL 2331988; Robbins, supra note 8.
12. In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d at 487-88.
13. Id. at 487.
14. Id. at 488.
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rights as an indigent mother denied counsel in a parental-rights termina-
tion case.15 The court properly denied petition due to the Texas Legisla-
ture's clear rule on the issue. Under the Texas Family Code, indigent
persons have a mandatory right to counsel in state-initiated termination
suits. 1 6 Those same persons, however, lose that right when a private
party brings the termination case; the right to counsel is then left to the
discretion17 of the trial court.' 8 This disparity prompts the question:
Should an individual's rights-rights that have constitutional implica-
tions-depend upon the entity or person that brings suit against the indi-
vidual? Arguably, this discrepancy has implications in both the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 9
This Comment will explore the various arguments and interpretations
surrounding an indigent parent's right to counsel in parental-rights termi-
nation suits, using the Rhine case as an illustration of the inadequacies of
current Texas law and how a clear, consistent standard would provide
better protection for parents and greater efficiency for courts.
The United States Supreme Court recently denied Rhine's petition for
certiorari to hear the case of In re J.C.,20 although it has not addressed
the constitutionality of right to counsel in a parental-rights termination
case since 1981.21 And even when the Court did address the right to
counsel in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, it held that there is a
presumption against the right to counsel in civil cases, and that courts
should determine the right on a case-by-case basis using the due process
balancing test, giving only vague guidance for determining whether an
indigent parent has the right to counsel. 22 The lack of clarity in the Su-
preme Court's directive regarding right to counsel has engendered varia-
tion among state statutes and common law on this issue.23  This
uncertainty has also allowed the creation of statutes such as section
107.013 of the Texas Family Code, which grants or withholds the right to
counsel depending merely upon the suit's initiator, 24 with no rhyme or
reason for the discrepancy in the statute's text. The Texas statute has
caused the strange situation of Tracy Rhine and J.C., which Rhine's law-
yers have labeled a "travesty of justice" for which "Texas should just be
15. Id. at 487 (pet. denied Feb. 13, 2009, reh'g of pet. denied Apr. 3, 2009).
16. The Texas Family Code grants the following right: "In a suit filed by a governmen-
tal entity in which termination of the parent-child relationship is requested, the court shall
appoint an attorney ad litem to represent the interests ... of an indigent parent of the child
who responds in opposition to the termination." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013(a)(1)
(West 2008) (emphasis added).
17. Discretion is nevertheless subject to the due process standards of Lassiter, 452 U.S.
at 27, and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See infra Part II.A.
18. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §107.013, .021.
19. Robbins, supra note 8.
20. Rhine v. Deaton, 130 S. Ct. 1281 (2010).
21. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
22. Id.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West 2008).
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embarrassed." 2 5
The Supreme Court must clarify this area of law by providing a better
defined rule regarding the constitutionality of the right to counsel in pa-
rental-rights termination cases. This issue is even more important now, as
there has been a significant increase in the number of parental-rights ter-
mination cases due to societal and statutory changes in the last twenty-
five years coupled with an increase in the variation of law among the
states. 26 Since 1981, states have taken the Supreme Court's directive
from Lassiter27 and interpreted it in a myriad of ways, with some states
guaranteeing the right to counsel for indigent parents in nearly all termi-
nation suits and others not guaranteeing the right to counsel in any
cases-merely abiding by the minimum constitutional standards set forth
in Lassiter.28
The Court must again address the right to counsel in parental-rights
termination suits to render clarity and uniformity of law among the states
for the benefit of practitioners, courts, and, most of all, parents. Tracy
Rhine was neither a model parent nor model citizen. 29 Perhaps not even
the assistance of an attorney at the trial court would have altered the
outcome, though an attorney would have certainly affected the court pro-
ceedings.30 Even so, the Court should have used Rhine's case to address
the constitutional question of whether a state statute that provides for
mandatory right to counsel in a termination suit initiated by the state but
does not provide such a right when suit is initiated by a private party
violates the Equal Protection Clause.31 With the heightened number of
parental-rights termination suits in the past couple decades as well as the
heightened importance placed upon them, merely abiding by the mini-
mum directives of Lassiter or conditionally giving the right to counsel is
simply not enough guidance for parents facing parental rights termina-
tion-often called "the civil death penalty" due to its permanence. 32
Part I of this Comment will discuss the history of family issues, gener-
ally, and parental rights, specifically, including a discussion of the current
procedures and pitfalls of parental-rights termination suits. Part II will
25. Melissa Fletcher Stoeltje, Legal Battle over the Fate of a Child, MY SAN ANTONIO
(Oct. 24, 2009), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local-news/legal-battleoverthe_
fate of a child.html.
26. See, e.g., Hilary Baldwin, Termination of Parental Rights: Statistical Study and Pro-
posed Solutions, 28 J. LEGIs. 239, 273-74 (2002); Emerich Thoma, If You Lived Here,
You'd Be Home Now: The Business of Foster Care, 10 ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE ACCUSA-
TIONS (1998), available at http://www.ipt-forensics.com/journal/volumel0/j10_10_19.htm
(discussing trends in the termination of parental rights).
27. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
28. See discussion infra Part II.A.
29. Stoeltje, supra note 25.
30. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 31-33, Rhine v. Deaton,
130 S. Ct. 1281 (2009) (No. 08-1596), 2009 WL 2331988.
31. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Rhine, 130 S. Ct. 1281 (No. 08-1596);
see also Erin Miller, Petitions to Watch Conference of 1.15.10, SCOUTSBLOG (Jan. 14,2010,
10:35 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/petitions-to-watch-conference-of-1-15-10.
32. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted).
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discuss the judicial and statutory influences on parental-rights termina-
tion suits nationally and in Texas, including relevant U.S. Supreme Court
precedent. Part II will also include an explanation of the history and con-
text of Texas Family Code section 107.01333 and the right to counsel in
termination suits in Texas specifically. Part III will discuss the In re J. C.
parental-rights termination case 34 and its unique progression through
Texas state courts and to the U.S. Supreme Court. Part IV will look into
other states' analyses of the constitutionality of the right to counsel in
parental-rights termination cases and illuminate the disparity among the
states in their interpretation of the landmark case Lassiter.35 Part V will
explain how the Texas statute is inadequate in the way it addresses the
right to counsel for indigent parents facing parental termination suits
brought by private parties, especially when compared with other states'
statutes. Finally, this Comment will explain why the U.S. Supreme Court
must again address specifically the constitutionality of the right to counsel
in parental-rights termination suits. Until the high Court provides such
guidance, Texas should expand the coverage of its statute-to provide
counsel to indigent parents in all termination suits rather than only those
brought by the state-to give parents more equality in the courts and
certainty of their rights when facing parental rights termination.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS-PROCEEDINGS
AND CONCERNS
Parental-rights termination suits are unique legal proceedings with an
unusual history in through both state and federal law. Termination of
parental rights is the process by which the legal relationship between a
parent and child is completely severed.36 Far beyond the effects of other
custody proceedings, termination of parental rights "leaves the parent
with no right to visit or communicate with the child, to participate in, or
even to know about, any important decision affecting the child's religious,
educational, emotional, or physical development." 3 7 The parent does not
even have the right to know the child's activities or whereabouts.38 Fur-
ther, the child loses all rights "to support or inheritance from the par-
ent."39 Beyond the lost communication, relationship, and support,
termination proceedings are grave in their finality; once the relationship
is terminated, it can never be restored with the exception of extremely
33. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West 2008).
34. In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d 486, 487 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied).
35. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
36. PROBATE COURTS OF CONN., TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND ADoP-
TION PROCEDURES 1 (2007), available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/probate/termination.pdf.
37. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAw: Doc-
TRINE, POLICY AND PRACTICE 375 (2000).
39. Id.
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Not all parental-rights termination suits, however, are involuntary.
Voluntary termination suits may arise when a parent gives consent for the
child's adoption by another family or individual. 41 In Texas, for example,
a parent may voluntarily relinquish all parental rights in a child by com-
pleting an Affidavit of Voluntary Relinquishment of Parental Rights. 42
Alternatively, if a suit is filed or to be filed that would affect or terminate
a person's parental rights, that parent may complete an Affidavit of
Waiver of Interest in the Child, "disclaiming any interest in [that]
child."43
If the termination is involuntary, each state's statute lists the elements
that the state or party must prove by clear and convincing evidence44 to
terminate the parent-child relationship. For involuntary termination in
Texas, the plaintiff or state must establish two elements: a statutory
ground for termination and a finding "that termination is in the best in-
terest of the child." 45 To satisfy the first element, the court must "find by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent has" committed one of the
statute's enumerated grounds for termination.46 Some of the many enu-
merated statutory grounds for termination include proving that the par-
ent has, among other things, constructively abandoned or left the child
without the intention to return, put the child in dangerous surroundings,
engaged in conduct that endangered the child, been convicted of certain
crimes including crimes that caused "death or serious injury of a child,"
used controlled substances in a way dangerous to children, or been the
cause of an infant "born addicted to alcohol or a controlled substance." 47
Texas courts have repeatedly clarified that it is not enough to prove only
a statutory ground for termination or to prove only that termination is in
the best interest of the child-both must be established for involuntary
termination.48 Even if a court finds that termination is in the best interest
of the child, it must also find a statutory ground. 49
40. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41. Termination of Parental Rights, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & Hum. SERVS. (2002),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/adopt02/02adpt6.htm.
42. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.103 (West 2008).
43. Id. § 161.106.
44. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982). For greater discussion of this
case, see infra Part II.A.
45. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2008).
46. Id. § 161.001(1).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In
re D.C., 128 S.W.3d 707, 714 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); In re A.B., 125 S.W.3d
769, 777 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied); In re C.N.S., 105 S.W.3d 104, 105 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2003, no pet.).
49. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533.
1408 [Vol. 63
2010] Deprivation of Counsel in Parental-Rights Termination Cases 1409
B. PROTECTING THE FAMILY-UNDERSTANDING THE Two SIDES OF
THE COIN
Termination of parental rights is unique because it is the only civil pen-
alty that permanently breaks apart the family relationship. It has been
described as "tantamount to a civil death penalty."50 It is well-estab-
lished that the family is a fundamental tenet of our society, a "liberty
interest"5' that is "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men." 52 But, there are many facets of, and some limitations to, this lib-
erty. There are two sides to the coin, so to speak. On one hand, parents
should be free to raise their children in the manner they see fit and
should not lose this right if their parenting skills are less than perfect.53
On the other hand, this liberty is limited when it endangers the safety or
well-being of children.54
The unique nature of termination of parental rights has engendered
heated and emotional responses from parties and onlookers alike. Some
argue that sub-par parents should be "punished," others berate state ser-
vices for taking children away from their parents, and yet others focus
their criticisms on the shortcomings of the foster care system.55 Some
have touted it "a cruel fashion of our times to systematically target prima-
rily poor families for permanent severance of their family ties."5 6 Such
heated responses are present even in the courts, as evinced by this dis-
senting opinion by Justice Springer of the Nevada Supreme Court:
[T]he state's modus operandi appears to be to go into the homes of
handicapped, powerless and usually very poor parents, remove their
children (almost always without the parents' having counsel) and put
the children into the home of substitute parents who are more afflu-
ent than the natural parents and more pleasing to social service
agents than the natural parents.57
Interests of both the parents and the children have been the subject of
intense controversy and media attention in recent years. On the parents'
side of the coin, some have been subjected to erratic suits regarding the
right to raise their children, exploited due to their poverty, and may face
further future limitations on how to raise their children.58 At the end of
50. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted).
51. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
52. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
53. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
54. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
55. See, e.g., Patricia Barbeau, The People Speak-Parents Lose Rights; Foster Homes
Protected, MUSKOGEE PHOENIX (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.muskogeephoenix.com/opin-
ion/local story_014010904.html.
56. Thoma, supra note 26 (noting that Arizona and Kentucky have initiatives support-
ing termination, named the "Severance Project" and "Termination of Parental Rights Pro-
ject," respectively).
57. In re Bow, 930 P.2d 1128, 1136 (Nev. 1997) (Springer, J., dissenting), overruled by
In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 8 P.3d 126 (Nev. 2000); see also Thoma,
supra note 26.
58. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (Harris,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993
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the twentieth century, a number of cases captured media attention when
children filed parental-rights termination suits against their own parents,
seeking what was termed a "divorce." 59 One child as young as eleven
years old filed such a suit in Florida attempting to terminate his parent's
rights due to abandonment and neglect.6 0 In the area of private adoption,
impoverished women are at risk of exploitation by unethical adoption
agencies. 61 There are accounts of private adoption agencies in Chicago
that "prey upon populations of financially and emotionally vulnerable
women, in particular Caucasian immigrant communities" to supply "a lu-
crative market for healthy white babies" in the United States.62 The
struggles of parents fighting for rights to raise their own children as they
see fit are not only ghosts of the past but also very real issues in the
future. President Barack Obama, his administration-particularly Secre-
tary of State Hillary Clinton, and U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer have advo-
cated for ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC), which would drastically limit parents' rights in raising
their children. 63 The CRC contains a section regarding the government's
duty and ability to unilaterally determine the "best interest of the
child." 64 Due to the increased government involvement in the family
under the CRC, it has been harshly criticized as "nationalizing parent-
ing" 65 and allowing intrusion "into the family sphere to an unprecedented
degree." 66 Alternatively, others support the CRC for its recognition of
"children's rights of participation, voice, and agency" as they gradually
mature, which "is consistent with social and developmental realities."67
On the other side of the coin, there must be some limits to the protec-
tion of parental rights when it involves the safety and well-being of the
child.68 A report by the Department of Health and Human Services
showed that about 753,357 children were victims of some sort of maltreat-
WL 330624, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993); Barbara Ellen Handschu, Voices of the
Children, 28 HUMAN RIGHTS MAGAZINE (Spring 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/
irr/hr/sp99hand.html; Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free
Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services of Durham, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 363, 372-74 (2005); John Rosemond, Treaty
Abolishes Rights of Parents, WASH. TiMEs (April 19, 2009, 04:45 AM), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/19/rosemond-treaty-abolishes-rights-of-parents/.
59. See, e.g., Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 782, 790; Twigg, 1993 WL 330624, at *2; see also
Handschu, supra note 58.
60. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 782.
61. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 58, at 372-74.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Rosemond, supra note 58.
64. Convention of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 9, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Sept. 2,1990).
65. Rosemond, supra note 58.
66. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, PARENTALRIGHTS.ORG,
http://www.parentalrights.org/index.asp?Type=BBASIC&SEC={30FF0076-5974-4B3C-B6
58-BBF7931E3EF8} (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
67. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Courage of Innocence: Children as Heroes in the
Struggle for Justice, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1567, 1579-80.
68. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).
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ment in 2007, nearly one-third of whom were under the age of four.69
Even worse, about 1,760 children died due to abuse or neglect, with over
forty percent of the fatalities being infants less than one year old and over
seventy-five percent under four years old. 70 Termination of parental
rights is a very real issue every day in the United States.71 In 2008 alone,
one report counted 75,000 children waiting on adoption with the par-
ent-child relationship terminated.72
To add another facet to already complicated, highly emotional situa-
tions, there are serious concerns about the child's future and well-being
after parental rights termination is complete.73 There are innumerable
accounts of children who, after successful termination of parental rights,
end up in "a series of foster homes, unable to return home but not free
for adoption." 74 In this scenario, the child's life has not necessarily im-
proved in spite of the long, hard battle that ended the parent-child rela-
tionship. In an attempt to remedy this situation, Congress passed two
major acts to address the "overloaded and expensive foster care sys-
tem"75: the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 198076 and the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997.7
The sheer number of children in the foster care system and the time
each spends in foster care are not the only issues. There are concerns
about whether a child actually receives proper care in foster homes. 78
The disturbing stories of children ill-clothed and ill-cared for in foster
homes are as haunting as those of children in homes with their natural
parents.79 Children who have already suffered in their natural homes due
to the various circumstances that caused their removal are, unfortunately,
"at high risk for further maltreatment while in foster care."80 There are
numerous reports, and certainly even more occurrences, of foster chil-
dren who have been "severely beaten, killed, and subject to bizarre pun-
ishments or parental neglect."81 The National Foster Care Education
Project in 1986 reported that "rates of abuse . . . at their highest, were
69. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Pro-
tection of Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, in CHILD, PARENT, AND STATE 186-87
(S. Randall Humm et al. eds., Temple Univ. Press 1994).
70. Id.
71. See 32 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 83 (1995).
72. Trends in Foster Care and Adoption-FY2002-FY2008, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
Hum. SERVS. (2009), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/statsresearchlafcars/trends.htm.
73. ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 38, at 375.
74. Trends in Foster Care and Adoption-FY2002-FY2008, supra note 72.
75. Id.
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-79 (2006).
77. Id. §§ 673(b), 678, 679(b). For greater discussion of this Act, see infra Part I.C.
78. MUSHLIN, supra note 69, at 186-87.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 188.
81. To illustrate the type of abuse experienced in foster care, two anecdotes are help-
ful. One child went untreated for epilepsy in a foster home for two-and-one-half years, yet
the state's child welfare department continued to send children to that same foster home.
In another case, a foster parent "forced [a foster] child to drink his urine" after wetting the
bed on numerous occasions. Id. at 186-89.
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over ten times greater for foster children than for children in the general
population."8 2 Thus, courts should proceed with caution in parental
rights termination because placement in foster care is not always in the
child's best interest.83 There are two sides to the proverbial coin of par-
ent's and children's rights, both of which parties and practitioners must
recognize and respect.
C. ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIEs AcT OF 1997
The United States Congress's passage of the Adoption and Safe Fami-
lies Act (ASFA) in 1997 significantly impacted parental-rights termina-
tion cases. 84 Motivated by the disparity between foster children who
needed permanent homes and those actually in permanent homes via
adoption,85 the Act aimed to "improve the safety of children, to promote
adoption and other permanent homes for children who need them, and to
support families."86 The effort to find children permanent homes, how-
ever, is directly related to parental rights termination because adoption
requires permanent severance of the child's relationship with his natural
parents.87 In an effort to increase successful adoptions, the Act instituted
more lenient standards for parental rights termination.88 For example,
the ASFA requires states to commence termination suits and actively
seek adoptive parents for all children having spent "15 out of the most
recent 22 months" in foster care. 89 This newer, time-sensitive, mandatory
termination term has caused especially severe effects for incarcerated
mothers who give birth during their prison sentences. 90 According to the
ASFA, the "clock starts ticking" for the time spent in foster care as soon
as the child is born, given to the state, and placed in a foster home.91
Thus, if an incarcerated mother's sentence is not complete within twenty-
two months of giving birth, a termination suit will commence. 92 This new
time limitation created under the ASFA was a significant departure from
previous law, which did not have any requirements to initiate termination
82. Id. at 187.
83. ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 38, at 375.
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 673(b), 678, 679(b) (2006).
85. Thoma, supra note 26.
86. Summary of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-89), CHILD
WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., http://www.cwla.orgladvocacy/asfapll05-89summary.htm (last
visited Oct. 28, 2010).
87. See 32 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 83 (1995).
88. See Summary of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-89), supra
note 86.
89. Id. (noting that a child had entered foster care on the date of "the first judicial
finding of abuse or neglect, or 60 days after the child is removed from the home," which-
ever is earliest).
90. Anne Hemmett Stern, Babies Born to Incarcerated Mothers, in NATIONAL RE-
SOURCE CENTER FOR FOSTER CARE & PERMANENCY PLANNING INFORMATION PACKET 2
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suits based on a child's length of stay in a foster home.93 States have
conformed their statutes to reflect the ASFA's time requirement.94 In
Texas, for example, the state legislature modified the termination statute
after the ASFA to allow initiation of a termination upon a finding that
the parent has been convicted of a criminal offense that resulted in "con-
finement or imprisonment and inability to care for the child for not less
than two years from the date of filing the petition." 95
Another effect of the AFSA's lower standards for parental rights ter-
mination was an "explosion" in the number of children taken out of
homes and placed into foster care.96 Commentators have stated that the
ASFA has not achieved its goal of getting children adopted but has only
increased the number of children in the foster care system.97 Mathemati-
cally, therefore, it has increased the disparity between children in foster
care in need of a home and those in adopted homes.98 Regardless of the
ASFA's purposes, however, it resulted in a dramatic increase in the num-
ber of parental termination suits after it was passed. 99 For example, after
the passage of the ASFA, parental-rights termination suits in Michigan
alone increased by fifty-five percent from the previous year.100 This in-
crease in the number of parental-rights termination suits throughout the
United States makes the right-to-counsel issue of even greater import
than at the time of Lassiter in 1981 and makes it imperative that the
Court clarify its Lassiter ruling.
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. PARENTAL RIGHTS TERMINATION IN THE COURTS
The issue of involuntary termination of parental rights raises constitu-
tional issues of due process and equal protection. The right to
parenthood has long been held a fundamental right of all Americans.101
Therefore, "[i]t is not disputed that state intervention to terminate the
relationship between [a parent] and her child must be accomplished by
93. Summary of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-89), supra note
86.
94. Thoma, supra note 26.
95. TEX. FAM. CODE Am. § 161.001(1)(Q) (West Supp. 2010).





101. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also, e.g., Troxel v. Gran-
ville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) ("[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of
their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by
this Court."); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982) ("[A] parental rights termina-
tion proceeding . . . [does] not merely infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but ...
end[s] it."); In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 733 (Tex. 2003) ("termination of parental rights,
fundamental and constitutional in their magnitude"); Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20
(Tex. 1985) ("This natural parental right has been characterized as . . . 'a basic civil right of
man,' and 'far more precious than property rights."').
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procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause."102 Due to
the constitutional consideration of the right at stake, the ability for par-
ents to have attorney assistance to protect those rights is one of utmost
importance, though the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed it on only a
few occasions. While the Court's holdings illuminate the stage on which
parental-rights termination debates have commenced, they have not gone
far enough to create uniformity among the states regarding the constitu-
tionality of the right to counsel.
The saga of an indigent person's right to counsel began in 1967 with the
Supreme Court's holding in In re Gault.03 In a juvenile delinquency pro-
ceeding, the Court held that the Due Process Clause required that the
juvenile and his parents be informed of the right to counsel and given
counsel to represent the child in the proceedings. 10 4 Though Gault ad-
dressed the due process requirements regarding counsel in juvenile pro-
ceedings, it left significant questions open about right to counsel in
parental-rights termination cases.105 In 1981, the Supreme Court handed
down the famous decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.106
The issue in Lassiter was whether denial of court-appointed counsel for
an indigent parent in a parental-rights termination case was a Due Pro-
cess Clause violation.107 The Court held that, under due process, the
"preeminent generalization" is that an indigent person has a mandatory
right to counsel in a suit where he "may lose his physical liberty if he loses
the litigation."s0 8 Thus, if an indigent person risks going to prison if he
loses the suit, even for a small crime, the court must provide counsel.109
Historically, however, the Court had been very reluctant to extend this
mandatory right in cases, even criminal, that may not result in confine-
ment or loss of personal liberty.1 0
Thus, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, "meld[ed] the criminal
right-to-counsel cases and the due process cases, and [did] so in a way
that add[ed] an enormous obstacle to obtaining appointed counsel in civil
cases.""1 With a presumption that litigants in civil cases do not receive a
right to counsel, the Court used the test from Mathews v. Eldridgell2 to
determine whether due process requires mandatory appointment of
counsel in parental-rights termination suits: balancing "the private inter-
ests at stake, the government's interest, and the risk that the procedures
used will lead to erroneous decisions."" 3 Although the Court noted that
102. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
104. Id. at 34-41.
105. Compare id., with Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
106. 452 U.S. at 18.
107. Id. at 24.
108. Id. at 25.
109. Id. (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972)).
110. Id. at 26 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979)).
111. ELIZABETH G. THORNBURG, The Story of Lassiter: The Importance of Counsel in
an Adversary System, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 22 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004).
112. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
113. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
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the right to parenthood "undeniably warrants deference," it concluded
that the "complexity of the proceeding and the incapacity of the uncoun-
seled parent" are not always so great as to "make the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the parent's rights insupportably high."1 4 Thus, the Court
refused to issue a blanket rule that "the Constitution requires the ap-
pointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding."115 The
Court left the decision to the trial courts, requiring them to make a case-
by-case fact determination on the ground level utilizing the Mathews due
process balancing test, coupled with the presumption against right to
counsel unless there is a risk to physical liberty. 116 The Court, however,
did not define how to make this case-by-case determination, reasoning
that "[it was] neither possible nor prudent to attempt to formulate a pre-
cise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining when the
providing of counsel is necessary to meet the applicable due process re-
quirements."11 7 The Court deemed specific guidelines imprudent in the
face of the "almost infinite variation" of facts presented in termination
suits.1 18 Thus, the Court left the states with a balancing test "largely free
of objective criteria for valuing or comparing the interests at stake." 119
Importantly, although the Court refused to adopt a blanket rule or to
issue specific guidelines, it did advise states that "a wise public policy ...
may require that higher standards be adopted than those minimally toler-
able under the Constitution." 1 2 0
Justice Blackmun dissented in Lassiter, disagreeing with the Court's
conclusion that "deprivation [of parental rights] somehow is less serious
than threatened losses deemed to require appointed counsel, because in
this instance the parent's own 'personal liberty' is not at stake."12 1 Black-
mun did not accept Court's presumption that "physical confinement is
the only loss of liberty grievous enough to trigger a right to appointed
counsel under the Due Process Clause."122 Further, Blackmun warned
that the majority's case-by-case instruction to trial courts would endanger
parental rights, because the Court chose to avoid "the obvious conclusion
that due process requires the presence of counsel" for indigent parents.123
Less than one year after Lassiter, the Supreme Court again addressed
parental rights termination in Santosky v. Kramer.12 4 Here, however, the
Supreme Court addressed only the standard of proof required by due
process to "sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their
114. Id. at 27, 31 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
115. Id. at 31.
116. Id. at 31-32 (adopting the rule in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973));
see also THORNBURG, supra note 111, at 29-30.
117. Id. at 32 (quoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790).
118. Id.
119. THORNBURG, supra note 111, at 31.
120. Id. at 33.
121. Id. at 40.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 35, 50-51.
124. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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natural child." 125 Justice Blackmun now wrote for the majority, holding
that the standard of proof is "by at least clear and convincing evi-
dence." 126 The Court noted that standard of proof is vital in cases ad-
dressing a constitutional right because it reflects "a societal judgment
about how the risk of error should be distributed between the liti-
gants" 127 and "the value society places on [that] individual liberty."128
Allocating the risk of error nearly evenly between the two parties in a
termination suit, as the preponderance of the evidence would permit,
"does not properly reflect their relative severity."1 29 Therefore, a height-
ened standard is required, to ensure that a parent's natural child would
not be taken from him "based solely on a few isolated instances of unu-
sual conduct [or] . . . idiosyncratic behavior" or because a parent was not
always a "model parent[ ]."13o The clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard of proof is proper, as the "interests at stake in [termination suits] are
both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of
money." 131 The dissent, on the other hand, argued the prudence of leav-
ing this decision to the states to determine how to best deal with "un-
happy but necessary" state intervention into familial relations. 132
The Supreme Court addressed parental rights termination yet again in
1996 in a case styled M.L.B. v. S.L.J., holding that an appellate court may
not deny review due to an indigent parent's inability to pay for the trial
record.' 33 In M.L.B., a Mississippi Chancery Court terminated a
mother's parental rights as to her two children.134 The court dismissed
her appeal, however, because she lacked the funds to satisfy the trial re-
cord fee, estimated to be $2,352.36.135 The Supreme Court held that it
was a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment for the state of Mississippi to deny appellate re-
view from a ruling that found the petitioner "unfit to remain a parent,"
for the mere reason of her poverty.136 The Court again stressed the uni-
queness of parental-rights termination suits and their difference from
other civil suits, as they "involve the awesome authority of the State 'to
destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental relation-
ship."" 37 The precise contours of this holding, however, are still debated,
and it only certainly applies to termination suits brought by the state,
leaving private termination suits up for debate and judicial discretion.138
125. Id. at 747-48.
126. Id. at 748.
127. Id. at 755.
128. Id. at 756 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)).
129. Id. at 766.
130. Id. at 753, 764 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 427) (internal quotations omitted).
131. Id. at 756 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 424).
132. Id. at 770-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133. 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996).
134. Id. at 106.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 107.
137. Id. at 128 (quoting Rivera v. Minnien, 483 U.S. 574, 580 (1987) (citation omitted).
138. See Boyer, supra note 58, at 371-72.
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While these rulings are instructive and demonstrate the Court's recog-
nition of the importance of the parent-child relationship, they provide
minimal guidance for states regarding the rights of the parents them-
selves, especially when the termination suit is brought by a private entity
rather than the state. The Court has failed to render the requisite clarity
needed for states to have uniform statutory procedures and policies in
these precedential cases. As an illustration of the inequity engendered by
this lack of legal clarity and uniformity, this Comment will explore the
right to counsel in Texas specifically.
B. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN TEXAS
When a suit is filed for the termination of parental rights in Texas, the
court will appoint an attorney to the child and to the parent in some, but
not all, cases.139 With respect to the child, when a suit is brought by a
governmental entity, the court is required to appoint both an attorney ad
litem and a guardian ad litem.140 With respect to the parent, the Texas
Family Code goes beyond the minimum requirement in Lassiter and re-
quires appointed counsel for an indigent parentl4' in parental-rights ter-
mination suits brought by a governmental entity.142 But because attorney
appointment for parents is mandatory only when suit is brought by a gov-
ernmental entity, appointment in private termination suits is at the discre-
tion of the trial court.143 In such private suits, the court's only duty is to
"[g]ive due consideration to the ability of the parties to pay reasonable
fees to the appointee; and balance the child's interest against the cost to
the parties that would result from an appointment by taking into consid-
eration the cost of available alternatives for resolving issues without mak-
ing an appointment."14 4
In the statute's original version, however, it did not specify that suit
had to be brought by a governmental entity in order for a parent to have
the mandatory right to counsel.145 Rather, the statute's original version
stated simply that appointment of counsel was mandatory for indigent
parents in (presumably all) parental-rights termination suits.14 6 Courts
across the state gave the text a broad interpretation.14 7 One Texas court
even held that a parent specifically has a right to government-appointed
139. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.001-.0125 (West 2008).
140. Id. §§ 107.011-012. An attorney may be appointed to fill both roles of attorney
and guardian ad litem for the child. Id. § 107.0125.
141. Id. § 107.013(a)(1).
142. Id. § 107.013.
143. Id. § 107.021.
144. Id.
145. Id. § 107.013 (West 1996).
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., In re J.C., 108 S.W.3d 914, 916 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (The
Texas Family Code, as of 2002, "requires a trial court to appoint an attorney ad litem to
represent the interest of an indigent parent."); In re T.V., 8 S.W.3d 448, 449 (Tex. App.-
Waco 1999, no pet.) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West Supp. 2000)) ("The
appointment of an attorney for indigent parents contesting the termination of their paren-
tal rights is mandatory.").
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counsel in a termination suit brought by a private party, and that "failure
to [appoint such counsel] constitutes reversible error." 148 The statute,
when read alone, "clearly impose[d] a mandatory duty on the trial court
to appoint an attorney ad litem to represent an indigent parent in any suit
seeking termination of parental rights."1 49 In the 2003 amendments to
the Texas Family Code, however, the text was changed to add the text "by
a governmental entity."150
After the passage of the 2003 amendment, it became clear that the
right to counsel in Texas was only supplied to indigent parents facing ter-
mination suits initiated by a governmental entity.151 This simple addition
to the text had a profound effect on the rights of indigent parents facing
parental-rights termination suits. But what was the reason for the limita-
tion? All versions of the Texas statute regarding right to counsel were
codified long after Lassiter. Thus, the amendment was not a direct result
of U.S. Supreme Court's 1981 holding. 152 Upon review of the state legis-
lative documents, however, there does not seem to have been much dis-
cussion or debate regarding this 2003 statutory amendment. 153 In the
House analysis of the bill, the bill's author, Representative Toby Good-
man,154 discussed the effects of other statutory amendments but did not
explain the addition to section 107.013.155 Goodman's report merely
states that "[s]ection 107.013 is current law unchanged with regard to the
functions of an attorney ad litem in a suit by a governmental entity."156
Thus, it seems this significant alteration to section 107.013 of the Texas
Family Code was made without any notable discussion or analysis.
The Texas statute's evolution in the past decade illustrates the seem-
ingly whimsical changes to parental rights the broad strokes left from
Lassiter allows. The 2003 amendment to the Texas statute, though more
precise than the rule from Lassiter, has not rendered clarity in application
in Texas courts.' 57 After the 2003 Code amendment, the Texas Supreme
Court soon held that "[i]n Texas, there is a statutory right to counsel for
indigent persons in parental-rights termination cases." 58 The court, how-
148. Odoms v. Batts, 791 S.W.2d 677, 679-80 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
149. Baird v. Harris, 778 S.W.2d 147, 148 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ) (holding,
however, that mandamus is not available if no such counsel is appointed in a private suit).
150. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West 1998), with § 107.013 (West
2004). See also Act of Sept. 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S. ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1,
884 (amending TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West 2003)).
151. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West 2008).
152. Compare Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981), with TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 107.013 (West 2008) (originally enacted 1997).
153. See House Comm. on Juvenile Justice & Family Issues, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B.
1815, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003) (Committee Report by Rep. Goodman) [hereinafter Goodman
Analysis].
154. See Act of Sept. 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S. ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1,
884 (amending TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West 2003)).
155. See Goodman Analysis, supra note 153.
156. Id.
157. Act of Sept. 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S. ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 884
(amending TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West 2003)).
158. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003).
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ever, said nothing of whether this right is limited only to suits brought by
a governmental entity.159 In fact, no Texas appellate court had explicitly
ruled that there was "no statutory right" to counsel for an indigent parent
in a private termination suit until In re J.C.16 0 In In re J.C., the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals cited no authority for its decision outside the
Texas Family Code itself.161 After In re J.C., however, other state appel-
late courts cited its holding as precedent for the rule that there is no stat-
utory right to counsel in a private parental-rights termination suit in
Texas.162
III. TRACY RHINE AND J.C.
A. TEXAS
In the past couple of years, the In re J.C. case has worked its way
through Texas state courts and highlighted the incompleteness of the
Texas Family Code section 107.013 as well as the Lassiter holding.163 In
March 2008, Tracy Rhine appealed pro se from a decision by a Tarrant
County trial court terminating her parental rights regarding her child,
J.C.16 Upon the birth of J.C., who tested positive for phencyclidine,165
Texas Child Protective Services (CPS) immediately removed J.C. from
Rhine 66 and placed her with foster parents. 167 CPS proceeded with a
159. Id.
160. See infra Part III.
161. In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied).
162. See In re R.A.L., 291 S.W.3d 438, 445 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009, no pet.);
Brothers v. West, No. 2-08-202-CV, 2009 WL 1270652, at *3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth May
7, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam); In re T.L.B., No. 07-07-0349-CV, 2008 WL
5245905, at *1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Dec. 17, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re C.M.R., No.
02-07-394-CV, 2008 WL 4963510, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Nov. 20, 2008, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
163. In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d at 487.
164. Id.
165. Phencyclidine (PCP) is an illegal drug with "sedative and anesthetic effects." Med-
ically, the use of PCP can cause "respiratory depression, heart rate abnormalities, and a
withdrawal syndrome." National Institute on Drug Abuse, Hallucinogens And Dissociative
Drugs: Including LSD, PCP, Ketamine, Dextromethorphan, NIDA RESEARCH REPORT SE-
RIES, Mar. 2001, at 1, 5-6.
166. This type of prosecution, in itself, has led to constitutional questions regarding the
right to bear a child and the "right[] of privacy and reproductive freedom." DORETrA
MASSARDO McGINNIS, Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: Constitutional
and Criminal Theory, in CHILD, PARENT, & STATE, supra note 69, at 84, 85. While this
issue is not discussed in this comment, it is nevertheless a relevant aspect in parental rights
termination, especially when coupled with the unsurprising link between poverty, drug-
exposed infants, and parental rights termination. BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, Poor
Mothers, Poor Babies: Law, Medicine, and Crack, in CHILD, PARENT, & STATE, supra note
69, at 111, 115. See generally Ellen Marrus, Crack Babies and the Constitution: Rumina-
tions About Addicted Pregnant Women After Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 47 VILL. L.
REV. 299 (2002).
167. J.C.'s foster parents are referred to by the fictitious names "Mr. and Mrs. Smith" in
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals for their identity protection. In re J.C, 250 S.W.3d at
487. However, they have subsequently used their proper names (Carl and Yolanda
Deaton), reasoning that "at this juncture there is no point in not using the parties names."
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 30, at 1.
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parental-rights termination suit against Rhine in Dallas County. 168 As
this termination suit proceeded, J.C.'s foster parents, Mr. and Mrs.
Deaton, attempted to intervene and become a party to the suit.1 6 9 The
court, however, struck the Deaton's petition for intervention. 170 Later,
"CPS nonsuited its termination suit" because the "statutory deadline for
disposition of the termination suit was approaching .... "171 On the same
day that CPS dropped its termination suit, the Deatons, in what the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals termed a "coordinated maneuver," filed a termi-
nation suit in the Tarrant County 324th District Court within hours.172
During this time, Rhine had received court appointed counsel ad litem for
the CPS termination suit in Dallas County because that suit was filed by a
governmental entity.173 But when a private party (the Deatons) brought
the suit anew, Rhine lost her right to court-appointed counsel.174 Though
Rhine repeatedly pleaded to the court to appoint her an attorney, she
received none. 75 At the end of a trial in which Rhine appeared pro se,
the Tarrant County court terminated her parental rights.'7 6
After Rhine filed a "Mother's Motion for Re-Trial" and a "Mother's
Affidavit of Inability to Pay Costs of Appeal," the trial court denied mo-
tion for retrial and ordered that Rhine pay $405 for a reporter's record
for appeal. 177 Rhine also requested court-appointed counsel for her ap-
peal; the trial court denied this request, holding there was "no statutory
mandate" for counsel in a private suit.1 78 Therefore, the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals received Rhine's appeal with no reporter's record and
without the aid of counsel.179 Rhine attacked the sufficiency of the evi-
168. In re J.C, 250 S.W.3d at 487.
169. Id. at 487-88.
170. Id. at 488.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 487.
173. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West 2008) (granting indigent parents
the statutory right to counsel in a government initiated parental rights termination suit).
174. In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d at 487.
175. Rhine informed to the court that she was "indigent and [could not] afford counsel"
though she loved her daughter and was "currently attending community college in hopes to
be able to provide [her daughter] with a better future and security." Id. at 488.
176. Id.
[The court found] by clear and convincing evidence that [Rhine] had:
a. knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remained in conditions
or surroundings that endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the
child;
b. failed to support the child in accordance with [her] ability during a period
of one year ending within six months of the date of the filing of the petition;
c. engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who en-
gaged in conduct that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the
child; and
d. been the cause of the child's being born addicted to alcohol or a controlled
substance legally obtained by prescription, as defined by section 261.001 of
the Texas Family Code.
Id.
177. Id. at 488-89.
178. Id. at 489.
179. Id.
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dence in the trial court, but the court of appeals could not review the
evidence without a reporter's record.180 The appellate court also held
that "no statutory right exists to appointed counsel in a private termina-
tion suit" because Texas mandates court-appointed counsel only when a
governmental entity initiates the suit.181 Though it is permissive for a
court to appoint an attorney ad litem for a parent in a private termination
suit, the statute does not mandate such appointment.182 Here, the trial
court decided not to appoint an attorney for Rhine and the court of ap-
peals, upon a proper reading of the Texas Family Code, did not overturn
the finding.183
B. THE HIGH COURTS
Rhine appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, which denied petition for
review, then to the Supreme Court of the United States, which recently
denied certiorari.184 Rhine's arguments were similar in both petitions. 85
She argued, inter alia, that the Texas statute, by giving an indigent person
right to counsel in a government-initiated termination suit while with-
holding such right in a privately-initiated suit, violates equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 6 First, she admitted that the
Texas statute, requiring appointed counsel for a termination suit brought
by a governmental entity, "[goes] beyond the Lassiter mandate"187 but
argued that because Texas has chosen to extend this procedural right in
some actions, it must give the right to all persons equally.' 88 For exam-
ple, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause for a statute to guarantee jury trial to mentally ill pa-
tients facing commitment proceedings under one statute but deny such
right under another statute.189 Similarly, Rhine argued that Texas could
not guarantee counsel to parents in one termination suit while arbitrarily
denying it in another suit without cause.190
180. Id. (citing Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994)).
181. Id.
182. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.001(1), (2), .015(a), (b), .021 (West 2008).
183. In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d at 489.
184. See id. at 486 (pet. denied Feb. 13, 2009, reh'g for pet. denied Apr. 3, 2009); see
also Rhine v. Deaton, 130 S. Ct. 1281, 1281 (2010) (denying certiorari).
185. Compare Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, with Petitioner's Brief on
the Merits, In re J.C., No. 08-0351 (Tex. Dec. 16, 2009).
186. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 19-20; Petitioner's Brief on the
Merits, supra note 185, at 9.
187. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note 185, at 9-10. While Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Services, requires only that trial courts conduct a "case-by-case analysis" on
whether federal due process mandates court-appointed counsel for an indigent parent, the
Texas Family Code requires such counsel in all government-initiated proceedings. Com-
pare Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26, 31-32 (1981), with TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 107.013 (West 2008).
188. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 19-20; Petitioner's Brief on the
Merits, supra note 185, at 16.
189. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 19-20; Petitioner's Brief on the
Merits, supra note 185, at 16-17 (citing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110 (1966)).
190. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 19-20; Petitioner's Brief on the
Merits, supra note 185, at 13-18.
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Further, Rhine argued that because the right to parenthood is funda-
mental and because the Texas statute affects the equal protection of that
right, courts must review with "heightened scrutiny" any limitations on
such a right.191 "Heightened scrutiny" requires a statute that inequitably
distributes a fundamental right do so only in furtherance of a narrowly
tailored "compelling state interest." 192 In this case, Rhine argues that
any interest the state may assert is not compelling when a litigant is faced
with termination of parental rights.193 The state's possible "pecuniary in-
terest" in the cost of appointed counsel is "hardly significant"1 9 4 and
"unimpressive" against a parent facing termination of her right of
parenthood.195 Further, if Texas believes that counsel is not deserved in
private suits because the parent is not up against the "vast resources of
the state" as in criminal cases,'19 6 it "understates the actual involvement of
the state . . . [which] is called upon to exercise its exclusive authority to
terminate the legal relationship of parent and child ... ."197 Finally, if the
state's interest is to resolve the termination case in an efficient and eco-
nomic manner, it "pale[s] in comparison"198 to the risk of a parent im-
properly losing her parental rights. Even if this interest in efficiency were
a compelling interest, it is likely best served by having effective counsel
for both parties. 199
Rhine also argued that, because the statute is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause due to "underinclusion," the court must either "declare
the statute a nullity" in its entirety or "extend the statute's coverage to
those who are aggrieved by exclusion."200 Rhine argued for the second
approach, because "deny[ing] all counsel would violate [the] Court's di-
rective in Lassiter that some cases require appointment of counsel to
comport with due process." 201
In her argument, Rhine pointed to the trend among state supreme
courts to rule that a state statute giving the right to court-appointed coun-
sel in some instances of parental rights termination but denying it in
others is a violation of either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due
Process Clause. 202 Rhine's argument illuminates both the underinclusion
191. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 20.
192. Id. (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967)). Though Rhine does recognize this standard may have changed slightly
over recent years. E.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1996) (weighing "the char-
acter and intensity of the individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State's
justification for its exaction, on the other").
193. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 21.
194. Id. (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28).
195. Id. (citing M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 121).
196. In re K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 565 (N.D. 1993).
197. Id. at 565-66 (quoting In re Jay [R.], 197 Cal. Rptr. 672, 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983))
(emphasis added).
198. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 22.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 23; Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note 185, at 17 (citing Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
201. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 185, at 23-24.
202. Id. at 19-20.
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of the Texas statute as well as the disparate treatment of the right to
counsel that has evolved throughout the states in the wake of Lassiter.
C. ARGUMENTS IN OPPosrnoN
Interestingly, the private party (the Deatons) bringing the termination
suit spent little time in their brief combating Rhine's constitutional argu-
ments.203 The Deatons focused their response on Rhine's lack of preser-
vation of the issues, pointing to the Court's numerous holdings that
appellate courts do not rule on issues that parties did not preserve at the
trial court, a principle Texas has applied to equal protection and due pro-
cess claims.204
In fact, the Deatons agreed with Rhine on her constitutional issue re-
garding the Texas Family Code but argued that while this statute should
certainly be changed, this case was not the case to do it.2 0 5 Rhine pre-
served no error and gave no evidence that she was injured by the lack of
counsel. She did not show that the appointment of counsel would have
changed the outcome of the case.206 With or without counsel, the facts
remained the same:
J.C. was born positive for cocaine and PCP. Ms. Rhine provided no
prenatal care[,] . . . gave the hospital and the Department a false
name[,] . . . provided incorrect information about the identity of
J.C.'s birth father[,] . . . had convictions for forgery, identity theft,
failure to identify, and fraud[,] . .. engaged in physical altercations
and made violent threats[,] . . . [and] tested positive for PCP when
J.C. was born.. .. [Also,] J.C. was born premature[,] . . . required
physical therapy[,] . . . did not start walking until she was sixteen
month old[,] . . . [and] was speech delayed. 207
Further, Rhine received a conviction for driving while intoxicated only
two months after J.C.'s birth208 and has, in the past year, been arrested
for mail theft in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.209
Under Lassiter, one factor to determine "whether the failure to appoint
counsel resulted in a due process violation," is "whether the presence of
counsel could have made a determinative difference." 2 1 0 Thus, the
Deatons argued that the results from the trial court were reliable because
203. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 30, at 31.
204. Id. at 6-7 (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2618 (2008); Single-
ton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 354-55 (Tex. 2003)).
205. The Deatons agree that the Texas statute should not have different standards for
public and private termination suits, as such suits "ask[] far too much of foster parents"
who often end up financing the suit in its entirety. Id. at 31-32.
206. Id. at 4-9.
207. Id. at 18-19.
208. Id. at 19.
209. Stoeltje, supra note 25; Erik Rodriguez, Valley Ranch: Target for Thieves, IRVING
BLOG (July 7, 2009, 9:59 AM), http://irvingblog.dallasnews.com/archives/2009/07/valley-
ranch-target-for-thieve.html.
210. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 30, at 9 (citing
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981)).
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Rhine "never had any hope of obtaining the return of her child and that
her strategy has always been one of delay and prolongation." 2 1 1
D. THE SUPREME COURT'S UNPRECEDENTED REQUEST
After all parties had filed their briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court, some-
thing unprecedented occurred. The Supreme Court invited the Solicitor
General of Texas to "file a brief in this case expressing the views of the
State of Texas." 212 Although the Court may occasionally invite the opin-
ion of a state attorney general, it had "never before asked a state solicitor
general to [file a brief]." 213 The Solicitor General promptly responded
with a Brief for the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae, recommending that
the Court deny Rhine's petition.214 Solicitor General James Ho first ar-
gued that Rhine's petition does not meet the "threshold presentation re-
quirement" of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). 215 Though she did grieve her lack of
counsel, the Solicitor General argued Rhine's constitutional issues of due
process and equal protection were never "squarely pressed or passed
upon in state court." 216 The Court has "almost unfailingly refused to con-
sider any federal-law challenge to a state-court decision unless the federal
claim 'was either addressed by or properly presented to the state court
that rendered the decision.'"217 Because the federal question of equal
protection of the Texas Family Code was not presented in the state court
below, it "deprived Texas courts of the critical 'first opportunity to con-
sider the applicability of [the] state statute[ ] in light of constitutional
challenge' and construe [it] 'in a way which saves [its]
constitutionality.'"218
Solicitor General Ho went on to attack Rhine's equal protection claim
regarding the Texas statute, labeling it "splitless" and "wrong" and for
which review was "not warranted." 219 The Solicitor General concluded
that, because the decisions of the four state courts cited by Rhine as con-
flicting were based on state, not federal, law, "no meaningful conflict"
exists.220 Further, because "the federal question was not pressed below
. . . on that particular issue, Texas courts have held nothing" and it would
be "premature to grant review on what Texas courts might someday
hold."221 The Solicitor General also noted Rhine raised only a facial
211. Id. at 31 (noting that the "case has been going on now for nearly five years-J.C.'s
entire life-during which time J.C. has not spent even one day in Ms. Rhine's unsupervised
care").
212. Rhine v. Deaton, 130 S. Ct. 357, 357 (2009).
213. Lisa McElroy, Last Week in Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 31, 2009, 3:16
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/blog/2009/12/31/this-week-in-plain-english.
214. See Brief for the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae at 25, Rhine v. Deaton, No. 08-
01596 (2009), 2009 WL 5021971.
215. Id. at 6-7 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988)).
216. Id. at 5, 8.
217. Id. at 7 (quoting Howell v. Mississippi, 543 U.S. 440, 443 (2005) (per curiam)).
218. Id. at 11-12 (quoting Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969)).
219. Id. at 6.
220. Id. at 21.
221. Id.
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challenge to the Texas statute, attacking "[t]he Texas statutory frame-
work," which cannot be facially unconstitutional because it does not with-
hold counsel from the entire class of indigent parents. 222 Even if the
argument is "re-cast as an as-applied challenge," it still fails because there
is "nothing arbitrary" in "separating [a parent] who face[s] the govern-
ment from [a parent] who face[s] private part[ies]." 223 Ho argued that
the distinction is "supported by an important element of fairness" in the
litigation-parents in a private termination suit are not in the same posi-
tion as those against all the resources of the State.224 Thus, the Solicitor
General Ho concluded that Rhine's petition "should be denied." 225
The Court's unprecedented request to the Texas Solicitor General
shows the nationwide concern and debate regarding this case, specifically,
and parental rights issues, generally. Although Rhine originally repre-
sented herself pro se, an impressive team of lawyers came to her aid on
appeal, including Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of the University of Califor-
nia, Irvine Law School.226 Her other representation included Charles
"Chad" Baruch of Rowlett, Texas; Ike Vanden Eykel of Dallas, Texas;
and Eliot D. Shavin of Dallas, Texas. 227 Baruch commented on the case:
"Due process means was it fair . . . you just can't stack this many things
and look at what happened to this women and say this is fair." 228 Baruch
gave additional impassioned statements to a San Antonio magazine, la-
beling this case a "travesty of justice."229 Baruch opined that while Rhine
is no "poster child" for parental rights, "Texas should just be embarrassed
that it's one of the few states left that lets this happen." 230
This case highlights both the underinclusiveness of the Texas statute as
well as the lack of one general standard throughout the United Sates re-
garding the right to counsel in termination cases. As Texas Solicitor Gen-
eral Ho himself noted, the Texas courts have not squarely ruled on the
issue.231 Therefore, since the 2003 Amendment to the Texas Family Code
limiting an indigent person's mandatory right to counsel to only those
termination suits brought by a governmental entity, the Texas high court
has not commented on the statute or discussed its constitutionality what-
soever. Thus, this amendment slipped into the Code in 2003, apparently
without much debate or adversity, and has been accepted as constitu-
tional and proper since then, with no discussion or affirmation from
Texas's highest court. This confusion regarding the contours of a parent's
right to counsel is not limited to Texas. Application of Lassiter varies
222. Id. at 21-22 (citing Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note 185, at 24).
223. Id. at 22-23.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 24.
226. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note 185, at i; Robbins, supra note 8.
227. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note 185, at i; Robbins, supra note 8.
228. Robbins, supra note 8.
229. Stoeltje, supra note 25.
230. Id.
231. Brief for the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae, supra note 214, at 21.
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among the states, with some granting the right to counsel in all suits and
others abiding by only the constitutional minimum of Lassiter.
IV. STATES' INTERPRETATIONS OF LASSITER
As Rhine cited in her briefs to the Texas Supreme Court and U.S. Su-
preme Court,232 other states have different approaches to the appoint-
ment of attorneys in parental-rights termination suits. In fact, at least five
other state supreme courts have held that due process or equal protection
concerns require that there must be identical rules for appointment of an
attorney for indigent parents (whether mandatory or not) for all termina-
tion suits. 2 3 3 Additionally, other states that have expanded their statutes
by legislative process, rather than by the courts.234
Two of the states that have expanded their statutes through state legis-
latures are Louisiana and Alabama.235 The Louisiana statute was signed
into law in July 2008.236 Louisiana's statute previously gave a right to
court-appointed counsel for indigent parents in a state-initiated suit, but
it has expanded to provide that, upon the court's finding of the parent's
indigency, "an attorney shall be appointed to represent that parent" re-
gardless of who brings suit.2 37 The Alabama Code was also modified,
following a 1996 decision from the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals. 238
The current Alabama statute was signed into law in May 2008, and does
not distinguish among the possible parties bringing suit, merely requiring
that "counsel shall be appointed where the respondent parent . . . is una-
ble for financial reasons to retain his or her own counsel." 239 Notably,
these two recently amended statutes are quite similar to the Texas statute
before its unsubstantiated modification in 2003.
In other states, the state supreme courts have held that certain limita-
tions of state statutes regarding an indigent person's right to counsel vio-
late state due process or equal protection clauses.240 A survey of these
state statutes and the corresponding high court holdings is instructive to
show the disparity between these states and Texas. Beginning chronolog-
ically, the Supreme Court of Oregon heard the case of Zockert v. Fan-
ning, in which an indigent father was denied state-appointed counsel in a
232. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note 185, at 13; Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 31, at 20.
233. See In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645, 650 (Iowa 2004); In re K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d 741,
751 (Ill. 2002); In re K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 565 (N.D. 1993); In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276,
283 (Alaska 1991); Zockert v. Fanning, 800 P.2d 773, 777-78 (Or. 1990).
234. See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1245.1 (2008); see also 2008 Ala. Acts 277, codified
at MICHIE's ALA. CODE § 12-15-305 (LexisNexis 2008).
235. See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1245.1 (2008); see also MICHIE's ALA. CODE § 12-
15-305 (LexisNexis 2008).
236. Brenda Hodge, 2008 Session Highlights, LOUISIANA STATE SENATE, http://senate.
legis.state.la.us/sessioninfo/2008/highlights//Linkshell.asp?s=issuebyissue.
237. See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 320 (2004); see also LA. CHILD CODE ANN. art.
1245.1 (2008).
238. K.P.B. v. D.C.A., 685 So. 2d 750, 752 (Ala. 1996).
239. MICHIE's ALA. CODE § 12-15-305 (LexisNexis 2008) (emphasis added).
240. See cases cited supra note 233.
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parental-rights termination suit, though he repeatedly requested counsel,
because he feared that he was "being railroaded in this case." 241 At the
time, Oregon had two statutes under which parental rights could be ter-
minated. One dealt with termination proceedings brought in juvenile
court under Oregon statute chapter 419,242 while the other addressed ter-
mination proceedings due to private adoption under Oregon statutes
chapter 109.243 While the juvenile proceedings chapter gave indigent par-
ents a right to state-appointed counsel, the adoption proceedings chapter
was silent on whether such right existed.244 The court held that, while
"giving an indigent parent an opportunity to receive assistance of ap-
pointed counsel to protect parental rights is a 'privilege,"' that privilege
should not be partially given where there is no clear distinction between
the two statutes for grounds of termination.245 "The state is involved sim-
ilarly in both proceedings" and "[n]o distinction may be founded upon
the fact that a private person initiates an adoption." 246 "If the legislature
had intended to create a case-by-case right of counsel [as is the minimum
mandate of Lassiter], it knew how to do S0."247 The court held, therefore,
that the "privilege of having counsel appointed in termination cases ...
applies equally" regardless of who brought suit or the code chapter under
which it was filed.248
In Alaska in 1991, a disabled, indigent father was denied court-ap-
pointed counsel in a termination suit brought by the child's birth mother
after the trial court ruled that "it had no authority to appoint [such coun-
sel] ". . . unless the other side was represented by a state agency." 24 9 The
Supreme Court of Alaska ruled that the right of parenthood is "of the
highest magnitude" 250 and "one of the most basic of all civil liberties." 251
The court held that, although a private entity brought this action, there
was "sufficient state involvement . .. to require court appointed counsel"
because this proceeding is "wholly a creature of the state" and "the only
way the parties could accomplish [the adoption and termination]." 2 5 2
The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that an indigent parent was
entitled to court-appointed counsel in private adoption cases that require
termination of parental rights. 253 To disallow such representation would
"run afoul of the equal protection provision of [the] state constitu-
241. Zockert v. Fanning, 800 P.2d 773, 774 (Or. 1990).
242. OR. REV. STAT. § 419.525 (1989).
243. Id. § 109.119.
244. Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 419.525(2) (1989), with OR. REV. STAT. § 109.330
(1989).
245. Zockert, 800 P.2d at 777-78 (internal citations omitted).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 778.
248. Id. at 779.
249. In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 278 (Alaska 1991).
250. Id. at 279.
251. Id. at 279 (quoting Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 895 (Alaska 1979)).
252. Id. at 283.
253. In re K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 560 (N.D. 1993).
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tion."254 The court stated that, even if the termination suit is brought by
a private party, the state is nevertheless "called upon to exercise its exclu-
sive authority to terminate the legal relationship of parent and child"; 2 5 5
to say that the state is somehow not greatly involved in private suits "un-
derstates the actual involvement of the state."256
The Supreme Court of Illinois ruled in a similar manner as its sister
state supreme courts. 2 5 7 The court first noted that the "[e]qual protection
analysis is identical under the United States and Illinois Constitutions."2 58
The court then held that equal protection required that an indigent
mother receive court-appointed counsel whether the suit is initiated by
the state "or by the child's guardian or custodian," 259 as equal protection
requires the government to deal with "similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner." 260
Iowa has also expanded its statute regarding a parent's right to counsel.
The prior Iowa statute provided for an attorney appointed to a parent if
the suit was brought under chapter 232 of the Iowa Code 2 6 1 (Suits
brought by the state) but not if the suit was brought under chapter 600A
of the Iowa Code 2 6 2 (suits brought by a private party or relative). In
2004, the Iowa Supreme Court looked at this inequity in the case In re
S.A.J.B. 2 6 3 under the lens of the state equal protection and due process
clauses. 264 The court concluded that even though a private party brings
the suit under Chapter 600A of the Iowa Code, "the state is an integral
part of the process in a 600A termination." 265 Further, "there is no nar-
rowly tailored compelling state interest to deny counsel at public expense
to indigent parents facing an involuntary termination of their parental
rights." 266 Thus, the court held that the state equal protection clause
guarantees an indigent parent the right to state-funded counsel even in
cases brought by a private party.267 Not long after this ruling, a new stat-
ute was added to the Iowa Code providing for court-appointed counsel
for an indigent parent in all involuntary termination suits. 2 6 8
Not all states, however, have held in this same manner. For example,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi strictly followed Lassiter, noting that
"appointment of counsel in termination proceedings, while wise, is not
mandatory and therefore should be determined by state courts on a case-
254. Id. at 563.
255. Id. at 565.
256. Id. at 566 (quoting In re Jay [R.], 197 Cal. Rptr. 672, 680 (1983)).
257. In re K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d 741, 753 (Ill. 2002).
258. Id. at 752 (quoting Jacobson v. Dep't of Pub. Aid, 664 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 1996)).
259. Id. at 753.
260. Id. at 752.
261. IOWA CODE § 232.113(1) (2003).
262. Id. § 600A.5(1) (2003).
263. 679 N.W.2d 645 (Iowa 2004).
264. Id. at 647.
265. Id. at 650.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 651.
268. See IOWA CODE § 600A.6A (2005).
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by-case basis." 269 The court stated that one of the most important factors
in determining whether a lower court followed due process was "whether
the presence of counsel would have made a determinative difference." 2 7 0
But, the court noted that Mississippi, at that time, did not have any stat-
ute or case law "on the question of whether an indigent parent is entitled
to counsel at a termination of parental rights proceeding." 2 7 1 Thus, it
only had the Lassiter holding as precedent.272
These varying state legislative and judicial interpretations in parental-
rights termination suits illustrate the disparate law throughout the nation
regarding an indigent person's right to counsel in parental-rights termina-
tion proceedings and should be remedied for the benefit of not only par-
ents but also practitioners and courts.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
Though the issue of family protection and family rights is a "fundamen-
tal liberty interest,"273 the aftermath of Lassiter has unfortunately left the
"door . . . open to experimentation by the states."274 It has also left indi-
gent parents wondering what individual states have decided regarding the
right to counsel.275 In Texas, for example, while the state statute has a
higher standard than Lassiter for state-initiated suits, the same is not true
for private suits. 2 7 6 This disparity should be changed both to attain uni-
formity among the states and to have a clear standard for parents to have
notice of whether they have a right to counsel in involuntary termination
proceedings. In doing so, the Supreme Court should revisit its "loss of
liberty"277 standard for the right to counsel and expand it to give the right
to indigent parents in termination proceedings. Such expansion would
not only allow greater equity and clarity in these important proceedings,
but would also provide for greater efficiency of these suits, benefiting
both the state and the child. While the Court passed on its opportunity in
In re I.C.,278 it must revisit this issue again soon because the current eco-
nomic situation and ever-changing state statutes make this issue ever
more urgent.
The economic times we face now have pushed, and predictably will
push more, Americans into poverty or indigency. Because most termina-
tion suits involve indigent families,279 courts must take a hard look at the




273. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
274. Boyer, supra note 58, at 367.
275. See id.
276. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West 2008 & West Supp. 2009), with
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.021 (West 2008).
277. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981).
278. 250 S.W.3d 486 (2008).
279. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 770-774 (2001); Case Law Development: Poverty Not a Basis
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rights given to those indigent parents. It would be tantamount to inva-
sion of the fundamental right to family if the right to parent and develop
a relationship with one's child depended on the state of the economy and
one's ability to afford counsel. Judge Devany, in 1987 during another
economic downturn, best stated this potential danger in his dissenting
opinion in a Texas court of appeals case:
[W]hen we are faced with an economic depression and parents can-
not provide adequate food for their children, . . . parental rights will
be terminated [due to their inability to provide for their children] ....
[This would allow the] state [to] become a "big brother" form of gov-
ernment of such supremacy that it can destroy the very base of free-
dom and democracy in this country by destroying the family. 280
If parents' right to counsel and right to defend themselves in a paren-
tal-rights termination suit were dependent upon their finances, it seems
the economy would have an unprecedented role in dictating who is fit to
be a parent.
Current Texas law ignores the fact that an indigent person's right to
counsel is just as important against private parties as against a govern-
mental entity. The state is the only entity that may terminate the par-
ent-child relationship. 281 Thus, to say that the state is not involved in a
private party termination "understates the actual involvement of the
state." 282 Further, though indigent parents are often not guaranteed
counsel in private termination suits, it is in "private custody and adoption
disputes [that] parties frequently trade allegations of child abuse or neg-
lect that are integral to a charge of unfitness against the parent . .. whose
rights are threatened." 2 8 3 Thus, it may be even more imperative in some
circumstances that a parent has counsel in private termination suits.
As the Oregon Supreme Court stated in Zockert, discussing its own
state constitution, an indigent person's to assistance from counsel is in-
deed a "privilege." 2 8 4 While the U.S. Supreme Court did mandate that
trial courts give requests for assistance of counsel a case-by-case analysis
under the due process considerations of Mathews,285 it did not go so far as
to require counsel in all termination suits with indigent parents.286 Heed-
ing the recommendation from in Lassiter,287 however, the Texas legisla-
ture went beyond the constitutional minimum by requiring the
mandatory appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination
for Termination of Parental Rights, FAMILY LAW PROF BLOG (Jan. 11, 2008), http://law-
professors.typepad.com/familylaw/termination-of-parental rights.
280. In re S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 102 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.).
281. In re K.A.S., 499 N.W. 2d 558, 565-66 (N.D. 1993).
282. Id.
283. Boyer, supra note 58, at 368-69.
284. Zockert v. Fanning, 800 P.2d 773, 777 (Or. 1990).
285. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
286. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (adopting the rule in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)); see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
287. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33.
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cases brought by a government entity.288 Thus, it is a privilege in Texas
that indigents parents are automatically appointed counsel in all termina-
tion cases brought by the state. But, just because it is a privilege does not
mean the state can give it arbitrarily.289 The Texas Legislature gave no
rhyme or reason for granting this privilege in certain instances while de-
nying it in others. As the Oregon Supreme Court held nearly twenty
years ago, "[n]o distinction may be founded upon the fact that a private
person initiates an adoption" or seeks to terminate parental rights.290 If a
state extends the privilege of counsel above and beyond the minimal re-
quirements of Lassiter, it should do so without arbitrary delineations. As
Rhine argued, this is a denial of equal protection under the law, giving
very different rights to similarly situated persons.291 While Solicitor Gen-
eral Ho argued that there is nothing arbitrary about distinguishing be-
tween parents facing a termination suit brought by the government and
those facing a termination suit brought by private parties,292 that argu-
ment assumes there is something quite different in the challenges faced in
each. But, that is simply not the case when, in either suit, the state itself is
the entity by which a parents rights are terminated. In other words, the
state is heavily involved whether it is a government termination suit or a
private termination suit.
Further, having counsel for indigent parents in all cases supports judi-
cial efficiency, allowing the child to have a settled home and family rather
than dragging him or her through an elongated appellate process as we
have seen in the Rhine case. It is notable that in at least two cases re-
garding right to counsel in a private termination case, the opposing side
agreed with the indigent parent that he or she should have counsel pro-
vided by the state.293 Even the attorneys for the Deatons in the Rhine
case wholeheartedly agreed with Rhine that the Texas statute needs
change. 294
Uniformity and bright-line rules are imperative in parental-rights ter-
mination cases because they often involve indigent and unsophisticated
parents and parties.295 If an indigent parent is denied counsel in a termi-
nation suit brought by a private entity, it is highly unlikely he or she will
know the applicable law and whether the court properly applied the Ma-
thews balancing test. If the right is discretionary in certain instances but
not in others, the indigent parent is left to the mercy of a judge to ensure
288. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (West 2007).
289. William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1454-55 (1968).
290. Zockert v. Fanning, 800 P.2d 773, 777-78 (Or. 1990).
291. See Petition for a writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at 20.
292. Brief for the State of Texas as Amicus Curaie, supra note 214, at 22-23.
293. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 30, at 31; In re
K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 278 (Alaska 1991).
294. Stoeltje, supra note 25.
295. See, e.g., Susan Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental Rights-Termi-
nation Cases: The Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 179, 179
(2004).
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procedural constitutionality, because the parent (without counsel) has no
way of knowing if the judge did not. Such lack of assurance of procedural
integrity for a parent facing the possibility of being permanently sepa-
rated from his or her child is simply wrong. Further, the lack of uniform-
ity among the states heightens this problem. For example, if a parent is
haled into another state for a parental-rights termination suit, he or she-
without appointed counsel-is wholly unknowledgeable of the other
state's laws and is again at the mercy of the court, hoping the court fol-
lows its own state procedures regarding the right to counsel, because the
parent would not otherwise know.
Further, disparity in the right to counsel between a case brought by the
state and one brought by a private party leaves a loophole ripe for ex-
ploitation. For example, Texas CPS and the Deatons in the Rhine case
dropped and filed their respective suits within mere hours.296 As Rhine's
attorney said, although this is legal, it causes grave concern for possible
implications of CPS being able to say to a foster parent or other private
person, "'We'll dismiss and you file,' and then the (biological parent)
doesn't get a lawyer." 297 Rhine's attorney further opined that such a situ-
ation just "doesn't pass the smell test."298
In order to resolve these questions, the Supreme Court should revisit
its holding in Lassiter and formulate a more specific, bright-line rule re-
garding the appointment of counsel in parental rights termination cases.
As Justice Blackmun stated, it was improper for the Court to presume
that the permanent loss of parental rights "somehow is less serious than
threatened losses deemed to require appointed counsel." 299 It takes little
more than common sense to conclude that most loving parents would
gladly give up their own personal liberty, if the choice were between loss
of liberty or loss of a child. Further, allowing indigent parents the right to
counsel does not necessarily mean that more unfit parents will get to
keep their children. Rather, providing indigent parents with counsel in
termination suits will serve as an assurance of fair process and efficient
administration of justice-an end beneficial to parent, child, and state.
VI. CONCLUSION
The resounding theme in parental-rights termination cases is the ten-
dency of our society to treat, or desire to treat, litigants differently when
the object of the litigation is the parent-child relationship. The clear and
convincing standard of proof and the varying requirements for mandatory
appointment of counsel in these cases evinces this respect for the familial
relationship. Issues relating family relationships strike a chord at the very
core of our society, and warrant protection and deference. 300
296. In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d 486, 488 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied).
297. Stoeltje, supra note 25.
298. Id.
299. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 27.
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In the case of In re J. C. and its long progression through the courts, the
U.S. Supreme Court-after long determination-deemed the case unfit
for the Court to hear and passed on the opportunity to clarify the consti-
tutionality of an indigent parent's right to counsel. Such a determination,
however, is long overdue, as the facts of In re J.C. illustrate.301 While
Lassiter provides minimal guidance, the Court itself noted that states
should seek a higher standard. 302 But while the Court implored states to
reach for a loftier standard, it gave no indication as to what that standard
should be. This lack of guidance has engendered variation among the
states, as well as underinclusive coverage by statutes such as the Texas
Family Code. At the very least, the question of whether an indigent par-
ent has the right to counsel in termination suits should be uniform among
the states. The current scene, in which an indigent parent's ability to de-
fend a suit regarding her fitness to parent her own child can so drastically
change depending on who brings suit or the state in which it is brought,
drips of inequity and impropriety. The Supreme Court must, therefore,
clarify the standards that govern the proceedings so that our families, the
cornerstone of our society, receive the protection and process they
deserve.
301. In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d 486 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied).
302. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33.
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